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Causal quantum theory assumes that measurements or collapses are well-defined physical pro-
cesses, localised in space-time, and never give perfectly reliable outcomes and that the outcome of
one measurement only influences the outcomes of others within its future light cone. Although the
theory has unusual properties, it is not immediately evident that it is inconsistent with experiment
to date. I discuss its implications and experimental tests.
INTRODUCTION
There are fairly compelling theoretical and experimental reasons [1–17] to believe that nature violates local causality
and that local hidden variable theories are incorrect. However, while loopholes remain, the case is not quite conclusive.
In particular, the collapse locality loophole [18] remains largely untested. Moreover, causal quantum theory [18] is a
theoretically interesting example of a local hidden variable theory that remains consistent with Bell experiments to
date by exploiting this loophole.
Causal quantum theory assumes that measurements or collapses are well-defined physical processes, localised in
space-time, and never give perfectly reliable outcomes. Unlike standard quantum theory, it also assumes that mea-
surement outcomes respect a strong form of Minkowski or Einstein causality, in that the outcome of one measurement
only affects the probability distributions for the outcomes of other measurements within its future light cone. This
gives it very peculiar properties, which evoke the suspicion that it must already be excluded by experiments other
than Bell experiments and/or cosmological observations. Perhaps it is, but this has not yet been shown. It is an
interesting challenge to our understanding of physics to seek conclusive evidence for quantum theory against this
peculiar and even more counter-intuitive alternative.
I first review the definition of causal quantum theory, its theoretical motivation, and its very radical implications.
I then review the evidence from Bell experiments. As is well known, a long sequence of successively more sophisti-
cated Bell experiments have confirmed the predictions of standard quantum theory. However (with one only partial
exception discussed below) all Bell experiments to date are also consistent with causal quantum theory if the collapse
process only takes place when macroscopic displacements of masses or significantly different gravitational fields are
superposed. They are also consistent with causal quantum theory if collapse requires a measurement outcome enters
the consciousness of an observer. Since these are the most popular collapse hypotheses, causal quantum theory is not
definitively excluded by Bell experiments to date.
Finally, I consider other experiments that could exclude causal quantum theory.
CAUSAL QUANTUM THEORY
Quantum theory and special relativity are related rather subtly and beautifully, in a way that allows quantum
theory to violate local causality without allowing superluminal signalling. There is nothing evidently problematic in
this relationship, except perhaps that it is not so obvious how to extend it to include a theory of gravity. Still, it is
interesting to consider alternatives, even if ultimately only to be sure we understand just how compelling the evidence
is for standard quantum theory.
Causal quantum theory assumes that measurements or collapses are well-defined physical processes, localised in
space-time, and never give perfectly reliable or definitive outcomes. It then ensures consistency with special relativ-
ity by postulating that measurement or collapse outcomes respect a strong form of Minkowski causality, in that a
measurement’s outcome only influences the probability distribution for the outcomes of other measurements within
its future light cone. There may be no strong reason to prefer these assumptions over those of standard quantum
theory, even in the absence of experimental evidence. However, they are all reasonably well motivated: the following
paragraphs sketch some reasons.
Collapse hypotheses can be motivated as solutions to the quantum reality (or measurement) problem, as alternative
routes to unifying quantum theory and gravity without necessarily quantising gravity in any standard sense, or even
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2as speculative ways of connnecting consciousness and physics. All of these motivations are questionable, but all have
thoughtful proponents.
If collapses are objective, it is quite plausible that they are typically well localized events, and indeed this is a
feature of some explicit collapse models [19, 20]. As far as we know, all real world measurements are imperfect, and
it seems very plausible that this is true of all possible real world measurements or observations, including those made
by our organs of perception and brains. It is also a feature of most well known explicit collapse models that collapse
outcomes are never definitive – “tails” in the wave function persist. Also, as far as we know, quantum states in the
real world never precisely lie in the kernel of real world measurement operators.
The strong form of Minkowski causality that defines causal quantum theory holds in classical physical models
respecting the relativity principle, and the similarly strong version of Einstein causality holds in general relativity. All
else being equal, imposing this version of causality on a physical theory is the simplest way to ensure that it respects
at least the signalling constraints implied by special and general relativity.
Measurement model and assumptions
We can define causal quantum theory [18] by an abstract black box model of measurements, rather than speci-
fying a particular localized collapse theory or measurement model. We will focus here on measurements that are
approximations to an ideal detection of a single particle: it is easy to generalize our discussion to other types of local
measurements. In our model, a measurement M is defined by a set of Kraus operators {Ai}i∈I and is a physical
operation that takes place inside a finite black box, which produces an output (the measurement outcome i). To
simplify, we suppose the box is of negligible size and that the measurement takes negligible time, so that in our model
we can approximate the measurement output as being created at a definite point xM in space-time. We assume a
fixed background space-time with no closed time-like curves. Our discussion applies in any such space-time, but for
definiteness we consider Minkowski space unless otherwise specified.
The measurement operators include a distinguished operator, A0, whose outcome is supposed to correspond approx-
imately to the event that no particle was detected in the box. The other outcomes i 6= 0 are supposed to correspond
approximately to a detection of a particle in the box, perhaps together with other information – for example, the
type of particle detected and/or information about internal degrees of freedom. So, suppressing internal degrees of
freedom to simplify the illustration, if ψ(x1, . . . , xn) is an n-particle state with zero particle probability density inside
the box, we have Aiψ ≈ 0 for i 6= 0.[31]
The measurement operators Ai are supposed to roughly approximate projections, Ai ≈ Pi, where Pi is a projection
operator corresponding to the relevant outcome. The sense in which this approximation holds depends on the details
of the collapse or measurement model in question. A good illustration is a GRW [19] localization operator Aax0 , which
acts on single particle wave functions ψ(x) by
ψ(x)→ C exp((x− x0)2/a2)ψ(x) , (1)
where a is a constant of the localisation model and C is a normalisation constant. This approximates a projective
measurement of position onto the interval [x0 − a, x0 + a].
While the Kraus operators may correspond to the specified outcomes to very good approximation, the simplest
version of our model requires that none of them has a zero eigenstate. For example, for any ψ as above and any
i, Aiψ 6= 0, although |Aiψ| may be very small. GRWP [19, 20] spontaneous localisation model collapses have this
feature.
One way to interpret this in models of measurement is to think of the measurements as carried out by imperfect
detectors that always have some nonzero probability of giving false positive or negative detections, of misidentifying
the particle type, and so on. As far as we know, every real world detector, including the perception organs and brains
of conscious observers, indeed has these properties.
A more general version of our model requires only the weaker condition that, given any physically realisable initial
state ψS defined on a hypersurface S prior to space-time points x1, . . . , xn, the prescribed unitary evolution law, and
any sequence of measurement operators A1i1 , . . . A
n
in
localised near the space-time points x1, . . . xn, the final state ψ
′
S′
arising on any hypersurface S′ to the future of x1, . . . , xn is well-defined (i.e. non-zero). This could be justified by
noting that in practice we can never produce pure states of a precisely specified form, and every physically realised
state contains small uncontrolled components that are not annihilated by any possible sequence of measurements.
This may also be true of the cosmological initial state.
The effect of obtaining outcome i is, as usual, to replace an initial state ρ by the post-measurement state
AiρA
†
i/Tr(AiρA
†
i ) . (2)
3We allow here the possibility that ρmay be mixed. Since the Kraus operators have no zero eigenstates, the denominator
is always nonzero, and so this effect is always well defined.
So far, this picture is consistent with standard formulations of quantum theory, modulo some vagueness about
whether we can think of measurement outcomes as arising at a definite space-time point (and if so exactly which
point). In a version of Copenhagen quantum theory with prescribed Heisenberg cuts defining measurement apparatus,
we can think of our black boxes as defined spatially by measurement apparatus and temporally by the measurement
process, or by regions within these space-time regions. On Wigner’s hypothesis, we can define the black boxes spatially
by the brains of conscious observers and temporally by their conscious perception times.
The Dirac-von Neumann treatment of measurements corresponding to projection operators can be understood in
this model – as generally in modern formulations of quantum theory – as a mathematically useful but physically
unrealistic limiting case.
Standard relativistic quantum theory
Now suppose that we have a relativistically covariant quantum evolution law, with quantum states ψS defined on
space-like hypersurfaces S via the Tomonaga-Schwinger formalism. We need to include the effects of measurements
within this framework.
The standard way to do this is to define ψS by applying the unitary evolution from the initial hypersurface S0 to
S, together with the measurement transformations (2) for all measurements taking place between S0 and S. The
outcome probabilities of measurements on (or in the near future of) S are then obtained from ψS in the usual way. In
particular, the outcome probabilities for a measurement localized at the point x ∈ S depend only on the local density
matrix of ψS at x. Since the quantum measurement postulate is consistent with Minkowski causality, this prescription
gives a well-defined answer and is Lorentz covariant. In particular, it does not matter in which order (2) is applied
for space-like separated measurement events. This prescription defines standard relativistic quantum theory within
our model of measurements.
Causal quantum theory
By contrast, in causal quantum theory, the outcome probabilities for a measurement localized at the point x depend
only on the local density matrix of ψΛ(x) at x, where, loosely speaking, ψΛ(x) is the wave function defined on the
past light cone Λ(x) of x. More precisely, the local density matrix is the limit of the local density matrices for the
wave functions of spacelike hypersurfaces S tending to Λ(x). Equivalently, we calculate the local density matrix at
x from ψS , defined for any spacelike hypersurface S through x, but for this calculation we define ψS allowing only
for the outcomes of measurements inside Λ(x). According to this prescription, if i and j are possible outcomes of
measurements at spacelike separated points x and y, then Prob(i) = Prob(i|j). In other words, conditioning on
space-like separated measurement events makes no difference.
This prescription, clearly, is not consistent with standard quantum theory. For example, it predicts that if we
can arrange spacelike separated measurement events that correspond approximately to spin measurements of two
separated particles in a spin singlet, the outcomes will be random (as in standard quantum theory) but also uncorre-
lated, whatever measurements are chosen. Standard quantum theory predicts approximate anti-correlation when the
measurements are the same. We now consider this in more detail.
Internal consistency of causal quantum theory
Is this prescription self consistent? At first sight it may seem that spacelike separated measurements at x and y
can give inconsistent outcomes. For example, spacelike separated sz measurements on a singlet state
Ψ− = (
1√
2
)(| ↑〉L| ↓〉R − | ↓〉L| ↑〉R) (3)
could give outcomes coresponding to | ↑〉L and | ↑〉R. . If this were precisely true, the quantum state and local
density matrix would be undefined at points in the joint future of x and y, and we would have no prescription for the
probabilities of measurement outcomes there.
4Recall, though, that our model requires that the Kraus operators defining measurement outcomes have no zero
eigenvalues. However closely a product of such operators approximates a projection operator, it cannot annihilate
the quantum state. The resulting state may have very small norm, but the denominator in (2) ensures a normalised
post-measurement state after any sequence of measurement outcomes.
We could also invoke the fact that, as far as we know, it is impossible to prepare or find in nature a system
represented precisely by the state (3). A full discussion would take this into account, noting that at best we can
prepare a mixed state dominated by states of the form
Ψ = a↑↓| ↑〉L| ↓〉R + a↓↑| ↓〉L| ↑〉R + a↑↑| ↑〉L| ↑〉R + a↓↓| ↓〉L| ↓〉R , (4)
where the four coefficents are all non-zero, with a↑↓ ≈ 1√2 , a↓↑ ≈ − 1√2 , a↑↑ ≈ 0, a↓↓ ≈ 0. For simplicity of illustration,
we neglect this here (although it is an important defence of causal quantum theory and the details may significantly
affect its implications in any given example) and focus on the first point.
Suppose then that the state of the relevant system is precisely (3). The operator corresponding to the outcome we
label “sz = | ↑〉” might for example take the form
A↑ = (1− )| ↑〉〈↑ |+ | ↓〉〈↓ | , (5)
and similarly the outcome we label “sz = | ↓〉” is A↓ = I−A↑. Our model allows  to be arbitrarily small, but requires
 > 0.
We then have that
A↑LA
↑
RΨ− =
1√
2
(1− )(| ↑〉L| ↓〉R − | ↓〉L| ↑〉R , (6)
which has norm (1 − ) and normalises to Ψ−. The key point here is that, while the norm is small, it is non-zero.
Hence, we still have a well-defined state and a consistent prescription for obtaining measurement probabilities in the
joint future of x and y.
Now consider an extension of this experiment, in which the L and R wings are widely separated enough that a
sequence of N measurements can be carried out within a region RL on the L wing, and a sequence of N measurements
within a region RR on the R wing, with the regions RL and RR space-like separated.
Suppose that the first measurement on the L wing produces outcome A↑L. According to causal quantum theory, the
relevant unnormalised state for calculating outcomes of the second measurement on the L wing is
A↑LΨ− =
1√
2
(1− )(| ↑〉L| ↓〉R − | ↓〉L| ↑〉R . (7)
This normalises to
((1− )2 + 2)−1/2(1− )(| ↑〉L| ↓〉R − | ↓〉L| ↑〉R . (8)
The second measurement thus has outcome A↑L with probability
((1− )3 + 3)((1− )2 + 2)−1 = 1− − 2 +O(3) . (9)
Assuming this outcome is realised, the third measurement has the same outcome with probability even closer to
(1− ), and so on.
With high probability, the first several outcomes will be A↑L, making the local state closer and closer to | ↑〉L〈↑ |L.
Outcomes A↓L will continue to have probability +O(
2), and will be realised with frequency ≈ . Nonetheless, with
probability close to 1, the local state will tend asymptotically to | ↑〉L〈↑ |L. A sequence of N measurements with
proportion ≈ (1− ) having outcome A↑L will give local observers on this wing increasingly strong evidence that, for
practical purposes, they may take their local state to be very close to | ↑〉L〈↑ |L, so long as measurement outcomes
elsewhere may be neglected.
Now suppose the first measurement on the R wing also produces outcome A↑R. This will be the case with probability
1
2 , independent of the outcomes of the measurements on the L wing. The same discussion applies. So, with probability
close to 1, the local state on the R wing will tend asymptotically to | ↑〉R〈↑ |R, and local observers will obtain increasing
evidence that, for practical purposes, they may take their local state to be very close to | ↑〉R〈↑ |R, again so long as
measurement outcomes elsewhere may be neglected.
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FIG. 1: Spacelike separated approximate measurements on a singlet in causal quantum theory. The observers in each wing
carry out N measurements with the two sets of measurements in space-like separated regions. They then both wait until the
measurements from the other wing are in their past light cone before carrying out a further measurement. Measurements are
denoted by blue dots and light rays by red lines.
Now suppose both observers pause after N measurements, and both wait until all the measurements from the other
wing are in their past light cone. At this point their local states revert to 12IL and
1
2IR respectively. Whether or not
they are aware of the measurement outcomes in the other wing, their outcome probabilities for their next measurement
change: according to causal quantum theory, A↑L and A
↑
R now both have probability
1
2 (see Fig. 1).
This is a general feature of causal quantum theory: evidence about the state of a local system determines the
future behaviour of that state only insofar as measurement outcomes elsewhere remain causally separated. This is
true no matter how compelling that evidence would be in standard quantum theory. And it is true for systems of any
size or complexity. In principle, a dynamical collapse model [19, 20] version of causal quantum theory could allow an
apparently stable galaxy obeying quasiclassical laws to persist for a long period, only to be “overwritten” in the future
when its past light cone includes currently space-like separated measurement outcomes that are inconsistent with its
state.[32] Inhabitants of such a galaxy who know they live in a universe described by causal quantum theory might
(depending on the details of the relevant collapse or measurement hypothesis) be motivated to frantically carry out
more and more measurements confirming its and their existence, and to broadcast the data in the hope that it might
be measured again elsewhere, with the aspiration of out-weighting any currently space-like separated and inconsistent
measurement data.[33]
Is causal quantum theory too strange to contemplate?
Causal quantum theory might be criticized as maintaining internal consistency only by invoking the possibility of
highly improbable measurement errors and/or improbable outcomes arising from wave function tails. This is circular
reasoning, though. According to standard quantum theory, the measurement errors and outcomes that routinely arise
in causal quantum theory are indeed highly improbable. However, causal quantum theory is a new theory with
different rules for the probability of a sequence of measurement outcomes, and according to causal quantum theory its
measurement outcome predictions are not improbable. An unbiased scientific comparison of standard quantum theory
and causal quantum theory cannot invoke statements that apply only within one theory as reasons for disbelieving
6the other.
Again, it is worth emphasizing that, however strange causal quantum theory may be, it does have a respectable
theoretical motivation. To recap, this runs as follows. First, we accept the empirical success of non-relativistic quantum
theory when dealing with individual systems, and take this as evidence that the basic mathematical formalism of
quantum theory is an essential part of the description of nature. Second, we note that measurement plays a key role
in standard quantum theory. We note too that an adequately general and realistic account of quantum measurements
is given by considering Kraus operators with no zero eigenvalues, and that it is not absurdly unreasonable to postulate
that all measurements are defined by such operators. Third, noting the EPR argument, and the a priori puzzling
relationship between quantum theory and special and general relativity, we make the assumption that measurement
outcomes influence one another in a way that respects strict Minkowski and Einstein causality. That is, any given
measurement outcome only affects events in its causal future. Although this last assumption is non-standard, it seems
a priori quite natural within the framework of special and general relativity. Causal quantum theory is the result.
One could even imagine a counter-factual history in which the theory of approximate measurement was developed
soon after 1926, and the idea that measurement might be a definitely localized physical process was taken seriously
from the start. Given the then unresolved tension between quantum theory and special relativity, causal quantum
theory might conceivably have been proposed as a logically consistent possibility in, say, 1930. After the EPR
argument was presented, one could just about imagine causal quantum theory and standard quantum theory initially
being seen as genuine competitors, which needed to be distinguished empirically.
Of course, history followed another path. The EPR argument ultimately led to Bell’s theorem and Bell experiments,
which are generally taken to be compelling confirmations of standard quantum theory and Bell non-locality. The
theory of approximate measurements was developed much later than the EPR argument. And, although the idea
that measurement is a localized physical process is quite well aligned with ideas explored by some of the founders of
quantum theory, it was not generally seen as an idea that might have testable implications worth exploring until the
work of Ghiradi-Rimini-Weber-Pearle [19, 20], Diosi [21], Penrose [22] and others.
What is the fundamental status of causal quantum theory?
The extent to which ordinary quantum theory is well-defined is already a delicate question. Some standard textbook
versions of quantum theory offer versions of a Copenhagen interpretation, in which measuring devices or macroscopic
amplifications play a fundamental role in defining the theory. No precise definition of measuring device or macroscopic
is available, and so there is an ineliminable vagueness in principle in these versions of quantum theory. Wigner’s
speculative idea [23] consciousness plays a fundamental role, and is essential to the definition of measurement, can
be thought of as another Copenhagen-like interpretation. Again, though, there is an ineliminable vagueness, since we
lack any precise model of consciousness.
If we take these interpretations as requiring some qualitative distinction between macroscopic and microscopic, or
conscious and unconscious, then they imply that quantum theory is not universal. Alternatively, if we try to set out
an Everettian version [24] in which quantum theory is universal, we run into problems of structure, probability and the
problem of theory confirmation for many-worlds theories [25], and we find a lack of consensus amongst many-worlders
on the answers.
Similarly, we can consider Copenhagen-like versions of causal quantum theory, in which measuring devices (or
conscious minds) are taken to be qualitatively distinct from quantum systems. In these versions, the output of
a measuring device is treated as a stable classical record. However, because we assume that measurements are
necexssarily imperfect, successive measurements on a quantum system do not necessarily produce the same output.
Alternatively, we can think of causal quantum theory as a causal version of some form of objective collapse theory
[19, 20], with localised collapses, that aspires to give a unified treatment of microscopic and macroscopic physics.
Dynamical collapse models are designed to resolve the problems of Everettian quantum theory by postulating objective
probabilities that effectively single out one quasi-classical world as realised from among infinitely many possible such
worlds. Whether they completely succeed is debated [26]. Fully satisfactory relativistic collapse models have proven
elusive. Also, of course, collapse models make testably distinct predictions from standard quantum theory, and may
be refuted [27].
Causal quantum theory is thus an umbrella term for a class of theories. While this is true of standard quantum
theory in a sense, it is true of causal quantum theory in a stronger sense: causal quantum theory needs some localized
collapse hypothesis, and different localized collapse hypotheses can make very different predictions in causal quantum
theory, even when they are effectively indistinguishable when applied to standard quantum theory.
7EMPIRICAL TESTS OF CAUSAL QUANTUM THEORY
Stronger Bell experiments
Causal quantum theory can be thought of as a local hidden variable theory, in which the local hidden variable
is the local quantum state, and is influenced by measurement outcomes in its past light cone. Any given version
of causal quantum theory can thus be excluded by Bell experiments that close the relevant version of the collapse
locality loophole, by ensuring that, according to the relevant collapse or measurement model, space-like separated
measurement actually take place in the two wings.
Indeed, causal quantum theory is somewhat easier to exclude than a generic local hidden variable theory exploiting
the same version of the collapse locality loophole, since it makes specific predictions that differ from those of standard
quantum theory even for experiments with a single measurement choice on each wing. For example, as discussed
above, causal quantum theory predicts that, if we prepare an approximate singlet state
|ψ〉 ≈ 1√
2
(| ↑〉A| ↓〉B − | ↓〉A| ↑〉B) , (10)
and ensure space-like separated measurements of sZ on each wing, the outcomes in the two wings will be uniformly
random and uncorrelated:
Pcausal qt(↑A, ↑B) ≈ Pcausal qt(↑A, ↓B) ≈ Pcausal qt(↓A, ↑B) ≈ Pcausal qt(↓A, ↓B) ≈ 1/4 , (11)
whereas
Pstandard qt(↑A, ↓B) ≈ Pstandard qt(↓A, ↑B) ≈ 1/2 , Pstandard qt(↑A, ↑B) ≈ Pstandard qt(↓A, ↓B) ≈ 0 . (12)
There has been some progress in this area since causal quantum theory was first described [18]. In particular,
motivated by these ideas, Salart et al. [28] carried out a Bell experiment closing the collapse locality loophole
assuming that collapses arise to prevent superpositions of distinguishable gravitational fields and can be characterised
by quantitative guesstimates due to Diosi and Penrose. This experiment refuted a version of causal quantum theory
based on the same assumptions. It left open the question of whether causal quantum theory could still hold if Diosi
and Penrose’s estimates of collapse time were increased by a factor of ≈ 102, or other versions of gravitational collapse
model were implied, or other collapse or measurement models were assumed. Techniques for implementing stronger
Bell experiments that should be able to test the collapse locality loophole for most interesting collapse models were
described in Ref. [29]. Such experiments could also refute causal quantum theory.
Testing for multiple detections of a single particle
Recall that our black box model of measurement assumes some characterisation of measurement or collapse-inducing
devices, which may for example involve reconfiguring mass distributions or perceptions in human brains. Suppose
that these devices detect whether or not a particle is in the black box, and have efficiency (1 − ), in the following
sense. The measurement for box i is defined by two operators Ai0, A
i
1. Let ψ
i
0 be any single particle state with support
outside the box, and ψi1 be any single particle state with support inside the box. Let ρ
i
0 and ρ
i
1 be the corresponding
density matrices. Then we assume
Tr(Ai0ρ
i
0(A
i
0)
†) = 1−  , (13)
Tr(Ai1ρ
i
1(A
i
1)
†) = 1−  , (14)
Tr(Ai0ρ
i
1(A
i
0)
†) =  , (15)
Tr(Ai1ρ
i
0(A
i
1)
†) =  . (16)
We also assume that Ai0ψ
i
1 and A
i
1ψ
i
1 have support inside the box, and that A
i
0ψ
i
0 and A
i
1ψ
i
0 have support inside the
same region as ψi0 (and so, in particular, have support outside the box).
Thus, in a single experiment with a single measurement box i on a single particle state with support inside the
box, the detector will click with probability 1− ; if the state has support outside the box, the detector will click with
probability .
8Now consider an experiment with N spacelike separated (hence disjoint) boxes, labelled by 1 ≤ i ≤ N , on a quantum
state
ψ =
1√
N
(
∑
i
ψi1) ,
where the ψi1 are normalised states with support in box i, as above. According to standard quantum theory, if we
obtain a click from box i, the post-detection state is
ψ′i =
Ai1ψ
|Ai1ψ|
(17)
= (1 + (N − 2))−1/2(Ai1ψi1 +
∑
j 6=i
Ai1ψ
j
1 . (18)
Here the normalisation factor is obtained using that the states Ai1ψ
j
1 for 1 ≤ j ≤ N are all orthogonal, with |Ai1ψi1|2 =
1− and |Ai1ψj1|2 = . The probability PQM (i) of getting a click in any given box i is thus roughly N−1; the conditional
probability PQM (j|i) of getting a click in box j given that we get one in a specified box i is O(). More generally, the
conditional probability PQM (k|i1 . . . im), where k is distinct from i1, . . . , im, is also O(). To O() the probabilities
PQM (n) of getting n clicks are given by PQM (1) = 1, PQM (n) = 0 for n 6= 1.
In causal quantum theory, on the other hand, so long as the measurement events are spacelike separated, the
probability of each outcome is independent of the others. We have PCQM (i) = PCQM (j|i) = PCQM (k|ji) = . . . ≈ N−1.
The probabilities PCQM (n) of getting n clicks obey
PCQM (n) ≈ 1
n!
e−1 , (19)
for n N .
The expectation value of the number of clicks is 1 in both theories. However, the variances are different. Causal
quantum theory predicts multiple and zero click outcomes that are very unlikely according to standard quantum
theory. Note that causal quantum theory does not predict that, when multiple detections are made, the system goes
on indefinitely to behave as though it now contains multiple particles. Events in the joint future of all the detectors
are predicted by allowing for all the detector measurements, in a way consistent with the possibility that all but one of
the detectors produced a false positive result – a possibility which always has nonzero probability. Trying to bring the
“detected particles” together in order to verify violation of a conservation law (which has zero probability in standard
quantum theory) will thus always fail.
Nonetheless, spacelike separated sets of detectors should often register anomalous multiple detections from a single
particle, and in our measurement model evidence of such multiple detections persists even in the intersection of their
future light cones. It is interesting to ask whether we should expect to have seen evidence of something like this in
existing experiments, observations such as cosmic ray tracks in mica, or elsewhere, if causal quantum theory were
correct. It is not obvious that we should, given that the expectation value of the number of detections is the same in
causal quantum theory as in standard quantum theory. One reason is that our measurement model does not always
apply: the probability of a track appearing in mica in the absence of a cosmic ray is likely astronomically small.
Another more generally relevant reason is that, as in Bell experiments, the prediction requires specifically designed
space-like separated measurement devices appropriate for the relevant collapse postulate.
The case of N = 2 suffices for experimental tests distinguishing causal and standard quantum theory, since the rate
of anomalous double clicks would be high ( 14 +O()) according to causal quantum theory and low (O()) according to
standard quantum theory. Causal quantum theory can thus be tested with a single photon source and beamsplitter
together with appropriate space-like detectors. This makes it somewhat easier to refute causal quantum theory than
to close the collapse locality loophole in general: the latter requires a source of entangled particles as a component of
the experiment, although not necessarily long range entanglement distribution [29].
A very nice experiment of this type was carried out and carefully analysed by Guerreiro et al.[30] In their experiment,
single heralded photons were observed at one (and always only one) of two photodetectors, arranged so that the possible
detection events were necessarily spacelike separated. Unlike the experiment of Salart et al. [28], discussed above,
these detection events were not macroscopically amplified in spacelike regions. The Guerreiro et al. experiment thus
did not test a version of causal quantum theory associated with any particularly plausible of well known localized
collapse model. However, the techniques of Refs. [28–30] could certainly be combined, and extended to other collapse
hypotheses. Indeed, we hope this discussion will stimulate further experimental work in this area.
9Causal quantum theory thus can and very likely will be refuted by experiment. Nonetheless it is a reasonably well
motivated radical alternative to standard relativistic quantum theory that has essentially gone unnoticed for many
decades and quite plausibly still awaits conclusive refutation. It raises the question: what else might we be missing?
CONCLUSIONS
Causal quantum theory relies on some form of objective localized collapse or measurement model. These models may
of course be incorrect, and their motivations, though reasonable, are not universally appreciated. Causal quantum
theory is also a strange theory that makes predictions that run counter to the intuition of anyone familiar with
standard quantum theory. It may perhaps already be contradicted by experiment or observation, though it does not
seem obvious that it is.
Different people may reasonably assign different weights to each of these arguments, but all of them give some
reason to be sceptical about causal quantum theory, and in combination they probably give very strong reasons to be
sceptical. Even so, a conclusive experimental refutation would be more compelling, and I hope the present discussion
may stimulate experimental work.
One might, perhaps, also entertain the idea that causal quantum theory could apply to some part of nature but
not all. The most obvious candidate here is the gravitational field, given that Einstein causality is a fundamental
feature of general relativity. A theory in which the gravitational field is determined by causal quantum theory rules,
while matter correlations follow standard quantum predictions, might seem even stranger than fully-fledged causal
quantum theory. Again, though, a conclusive experimental refutation would be a more compelling argument.
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